Celebrating Martin Luther King, Jr. by standing up to injustice
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere. We are caught in an inescapable network of mutuality, tied in a single garment of destiny. Whatever affects one directly, affects all indirectly. Never again can we afford to live with the narrow, provincial “outside agitator” idea. Anyone who lives inside the United States can never be considered an outsider anywhere within its bounds.”
Martin Luther King. Jr. Letter from a Birmingham jail.
Does the processing of Bryan J. Brown’s file through the Indiana Board of Law Examiners and Indiana Supreme Court document an injustice?
Merely consider the High Court’s usual and standard custom in measuring out “justice” against bar applicants and recently admitted attorneys (who, unlike me, lied to the Bar Examiners during processing). New attorneys (unlike me, who has beeen practicing since 1996) while involved in indecent exposure, child molestation and even downloading kiddie porn. Chief Justice Randall Sheperd ruled all of the cases presented herein.
For the record, I must admit that I am a pro-life activist who was arrested a dozen times — and only convicted of misdemeanors once or twice — a full 18 years ago. My processes through the Indiana system, as set forth in the federal complaint, focused upon my pro-life beliefs and theological perspectives – especially as it affects my view of governance.
What if Brown had used children as sex objects rather than attempting to save children from the ravenous abortion industry?
Or what if Brown had recently exposed himself in public instead of engaging in public acts of civil disobedience 18 years ago?
Or what if Brown had been caught downloading kiddie porn while in the midst of applying to become an Indiana attorney instead of writing letters urging the kommissars handing his case to respect the state and federall constitutions to which they swore an oath?
Well now, that would be a different kettle of Hoosier fish. Read on to appreciate just how different.
Here are some of the Indiana cases that were placed before the High Court — to absolutely no avail.
ERROR OF LAW § D (Equal Protection and Unequal treatment)
The sentencing of Applicant to a five year ban in light of the case law on the subject reveals the final order of September 25, 2009 to be far out of step with Indiana law.
RULE: According to In re Lee, 262 Ind. 439, 441, 317 N.E.2d 444, 445 (1974), the Court’s “primary concern” in the area of discipline “is the probability of undue risk to the public.” The Court must determine “whether or not the public should be further exposed to a lawyer once found guilty of misconduct.”
In so doing, the Court has realized that “we cannot accept one standard of integrity of the advantaged and another of the disadvantaged, anymore than we can apply varying standards of professional competence for initial admission to the bar of this state.”
By studying the past cases of the Indiana bar one can identify a pattern allowing the present penalty of seven years denial to be put into a social context, allowing the question as to whether there is a disconnect between the “advantaged” – Indiana attorneys – and the “disadvantaged” – the Applicant at bar. And whether the evidence at bar suggests that the Board is employing “varying standards of professional competence” in the “sentencing” of the Applicant at bar.
The next applicant to review is Gene E. Conn. Attorney Conn was convicted and imprisoned in 1997 for sexual exploitation of minors. He had not disclosed the fact that he under federal investigation for that crime in 1995, the very year that the Board was doing its investigation of Conn. In re Conn, 715 NE 2d 379 (1999).
Conn, unlike the Applicant at bar, was deemed to have violated the Rules governing the Profession:
“We find that the respondent violated Ind. Professional Conduct Rule 8.1(a) and (b) by failing to correct his bar application to reflect that he was under federal investigation with reference to child pornography. We further find that the respondent, by conveying and receiving child pornography in violation of federal law, violated Prof.Cond.R. 8.4(b) by committing a criminal act that reflected adversely on his trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.”
Conn, 715 NE 2d 380.
As bad as what Conn did seems to most, the Court was not certain that it was, like Applicant’s conduct, a show stopper: “If the respondent had disclosed the federal investigation in his child pornography activities to the Board of Law Examiners as required, whether he would have passed the character and fitness review required of all candidates for bar admission is unclear.” Id, at 381.
Some might read into this a soft attitude toward kiddie porn on Indiana’s Supreme Court.
What was clear after his guilty verdict was that Conn not only violated the federal law on kiddie porn, not only violated Rules governing the profession, but also was in need of “an appropriate sanction” for his deceptions and downloading activities.
The Court turned to other cases of similar ilk to locate “discipline .. consistent with sanctions imposed in other disciplinary proceedings arising from charges relating to illicit child sexual activities.” Id.
By so doing the Court noted Matter of Buker, 615 N.E.2d 436 (Ind.1993) (approving conditional agreement for two-year suspension for displaying sexually explicit material to, and molesting, child); Matter of Kern, 551 N.E.2d 454 (Ind.1990) (two-year suspension for child molestation).
Attorney Conn, after being adjudicated for downloading child pornography, was given the “appropriate sanction” of a “two-year suspension from the practice of law.” Conn, 715 NE2d 381. It seems that Mr. Conn, unlike the Applicant at bar, was able to demonstrate some “mitigating factors” and thus take advantage of the Court’s “policy of accepting conditional agreements to encourage expeditious and agreed resolutions of disciplinary matters.” This is the same conditional program that the Board denied the Applicant at bar.
While yet on the subject of sexual indiscretions, Indiana attorney John M. Haecker was charged with 29 counts of voyeurism, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of I.C. 35-45-4-5 for placing hidden cameras in his Fort Wayne rentals. Matter of Haecker,664 N.E.2d 1176 (1996) Haecker pled guilty to six of the counts . He was to serve three years in jail, the trial court suspended the entire sentence and placed him on probation for a period of three years and fined him $600.
This Court was troubled by the “strong element of concealment” involved in the “clandestine surveillance, ” noting that it “implicates his honesty and trustworthiness.” The Court found that the “very nature of his acts brings into question his fitness as one who can be trusted to keep his client’s secrets or give effective legal advice.” Haekcer was thus deemed to have violated a Rule of Professional Conduct since he committed “a criminal act that reflects adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer”
The Court was clearly troubled by Haecker’ s conduct stating that
“We recognize a need for rigorous discipline given the seriousness of the misconduct occurring in this case. Our gravest concern is that the respondent’s actions were the product of a deliberate, premeditated plan to invade the privacy of the occupants of his rental property. The respondent went to great lengths to formulate, design and implement the instruments of his misconduct. He left in place the means of his illegal surveillance over an extended period with the specific objective of recording private events at future times.” Id. at 1177.
Thus the Court suspended Haecker from the practice of law for a period of not less than six (6) months and did not allow him an automatic restatement.
Thus the time out for molesting children appears to be a standard 24 months. The time out for months of secretly taping your tenants whilst in intimate activity, 6 months.
Applicant’s time out is 60 months, if the five years is reckoned, or 84 months if the seven years is figured. Applicant’s crimes, whatever they were, must be about three times more serious than molesting children and at least ten times more serious than clandestinely taping tenants in their most intimate moments. Yet Applicant stands accused of no crime at this time.
Finally consider, In the Matter of Timothy Staggs, 894 N.E.2d 535 (2008) as instructive in the matter at bar since it was being decided while Applicant’s case was pending. Mr. Staggs filed his application in the Spring of 2005, two years prior to Applicant’s Spring 2007 filing. Mr. Staggs then engaged in an improper act in the fall of that same year.
Mr. Staggs “was arrested and charged with public indecency and indecent exposure.” Mr. Staggs pled guilty as charged a few months after being admitted to the Indiana bar. He only then notified this Honorable Court of his acts and failure to update his application during the process. Applicant at bar is accused of violating no rules, but instead of showing a profound lack of “insight” and having written letters to his handlers at JLAP and others that evince “a lack of civility” Mr. Staggs, on the other hand, was found in violation of
8.1(a): False statement of material fact to the Board of Law Examiners.
8.1(b): Failure to disclose relevant facts to the Board of Law Examiners.
8.4(b): Committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer.
For these acts the Indiana Supreme Court, just last year, take the following action adverse to Mr. Staggs’ ability to support himself and represent others:
For Respondent’s professional misconduct, the Court suspends Respondent from the practice of law for a period of 90 days… At the conclusion of the period of suspension, provided there are no other suspensions then in effect, Respondent shall be automatically reinstated to the practice of law.
894 N.E.2d at 536.
CONCLUSION: Applicant’s time does not fit Applicant’s crime. The disconnect is so glaring, in fact, as to raise due process concerns. Applicant raises the complaint that this disconnect is so glaring as to justify the label of “arbitrary and capricious.”
“Injustice anywhere is a threat to justice everywhere”
